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Abstract
Recent work in argumentation theory has classiﬁed diﬀerent types of dialogue that
represent conversational contexts of argument use. One that has been very little studied is
the interrogation. In this analysis, interrogation is classiﬁed as a subspecies of information-
seeking dialogue, and the goals, conversational rules, participants, and techniques of the
interrogation are identiﬁed. The result is a normative model of the interrogation. A main
problem addressed is whether argumentation in the model can be correct in the model, or
should be evaluated as inherently negative. Should it be seen as a kind of degeneration of
rational discussion, or can argumentation in a well conducted interrogation be judged as
correct and successful in light of the proper aims of this type of dialogue? Included in the
paper are analyses of some negotiation tactics, and some deceptive tactics associated with
traditional logical fallacies.
# 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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There is a vast literature on interrogation in the ﬁeld of law enforcement, but
hardly anything on it at all in the ﬁeld of argumentation theory. There is, of course,
a reason for this imbalance. Argumentation theorists have taken as their point of
interest rational argumentation in which two parties reason together to try to get at
the truth of a matter following collaborative rules of procedure (Grice, 1975; van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren, 2002). And the interrogation is
scarcely a model of how to conduct balanced rational argumentation. Far from that,
it seems to represent a coercive kind of dialogue exchange that is associated with
intimidation, even with things like ‘‘truth serums’’, or in extreme cases, the use of
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torture (Andersen, 2002: 22). So what lessons are there for the study of rational
argumentation in the interrogation? The answer seems to be that the lessons are
largely negative. They arise from the concern of logic with so-called ‘‘fallacies’’,
arguments that are faulty but that appear to be reasonable, and therefore are inter-
esting to study because they tend to deceive (Hamblin, 1970; van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1987; Walton, 1995). In the study of fallacies, cases are often
encountered in which there is a transition from a normal, collaborative type of dia-
logue like a critical discussion of an issue, to what might be considered, from a
logical point of view, a more pathological type of dialogue like the interrogation.
For example, the use of various tactics associated with leading and loaded questions
that might be quite normal in an interrogation, could be criticized as inappropriate
in a critical discussion. One way of criticizing the use of such tactics in what is sup-
posed to be a critical discussion would be to show they are characteristic of argu-
mentation techniques used in an interrogation. In other words, while the study of
interrogation as a type of dialogue seems to have mainly negative lessons for logic,
there is a positive side.
On the positive side, investigation of the interrogation as a type of dialogue that
has a systematic normative structure could be useful for all sorts of other purposes.
For one thing, it ﬁlls out the study of argumentation in contexts of use in diﬀerent
types of dialogue. In (Walton, 1998, Chapter 5) there is quite a bit of material
analyzing the interview as a species of information-seeking dialogue, but little on
the subject of the interrogation. But apart from the intrinsic interest of the subject
within argumentation theory, this new line of investigation may throw light on
interrogation as representing a familiar type of discourse with a deﬁnite structure.
This structure can be quite useful to know about, in the study of legal argu-
mentation especially. But there is another aspect as well. If the interrogation is seen
as a type of dialogue that has the goal of obtaining information to serve justice
and prevent harm, then normative standards for an interrogation that is good or
successful for this purpose may be established. Such a normative analysis provides
a basis for evaluating and criticizing tactics and techniques of argumentation used
in interrogations.1
1. Interrogation as a type of dialogue
From a logical point of view, as noted above, the interest in the interrogation as a
type of dialogue arises out of the study of informal fallacies and other phenomena of
tactics of argumentation. For the purpose of evaluating argumentation as used in
actual cases, it has proved essential to distinguish diﬀerent types of dialogue, or
formats of conversation in which arguments are used for some purpose. The context
of use of an argument can be modeled by a normative framework for evaluating the
1 I would like to than the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a grant to
support this research, and the two anonymous referees for helpful critiques and advice. Thanks also to
Elaine Fannin, attorney-at-law, Austin, Texas, for the formulation of footnote 9.
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given argument. A good (correct) argument is one that contributes to the goal of the
dialogue. A bad (incorrect, fallacious) argument is one that is used in such a way
that it obstructs the goal of the dialogue. Such normative frameworks have been
classiﬁed into six diﬀerent basic types in (Walton, 1998) as outlined in Table 1.
One type of dialogue of special interest with respect to interrogation is the infor-
mation-seeking type. This type of dialogue can take various special forms. One is the
journalistic interview, for example, of the kind typiﬁed by a televised interview of a
celebrity. Another is clinical questioning in medicine. Yet another is the kind of
computerized search of a data base for information on a speciﬁc topic that we are
now all so familiar with. In all of these dialogues, the goal of the proponent is to get
some information that the respondent presumably has. The respondent’s purpose is
to cooperate by giving whatever information he can prudently provide, given his
circumstances. The goal of the dialogue as a whole is for this transfer of information
to take place.
The interrogation would seem to be a species of information-seeking dialogue, but
it seems to contain elements of some of the other types of dialogue as well. Inter-
rogation frequently involves negotiation. For example, bargaining is a common
aspect of police interrogations (Williams, 2000: 212). Interrogation also may involve
persuasion, or even seem to consist of persuasion of the subject to make a confes-
sion. Before going on to study the relationship of the interrogation to information-
seeking dialogue, some account must be given of other types of dialogue related to
interrogation as well. For the interrogation has a way of shifting from pure infor-
mation-seeking to other types of dialogue.
A phenomenon that is extremely common in connection with the study of fallacies
is the so-called dialectical shift (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), in which a conversation
starts out as one type of dialogue but then shifts, sometimes imperceptibly, to a
distinctly diﬀerent type of dialogue. For example, a negotiation dialogue between a
contractor and a homeowner about the cost of installing a cement basement may
shift to an information-seeking dialogue on what the city regulations are with
respect to thickness of the concrete walls and ﬂoor in a basement. The shift in this
case is a legitimate or licit one, because the information produced by the informa-
tion-seeking interval could be extremely helpful in moving the negotiation dialogue
Table 1
Types of dialogue
Type of dialogue Initial situation Participant’s goal Goal of dialogue
Persuasion Conﬂict of opinions Prove your thesis is true Resolve or clarify issue
Inquiry Need to have proof Find and verify evidence Prove (disprove) hypothesis
Negotiation Conﬂict of interests Get what you most want Reasonable settlement that
both can live with
Information-
seeking
Need information Acquire or give information Exchange information
Deliberation Dilemma or practical
choice
Co-ordinate goals and actions Decide best available course
of action
Eristic Personal conﬂict Verbally hit out at opponent Reveal deeper basis of conﬂict
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forward towards its goal of reaching an agreement. In other cases, the shift can be
illicit, as for example, when a persuasion dialogue shifts to a quarrel, or eristic type
of dialogue where the parties attack each other verbally.
The term ‘persuasion’, in the sense meant in the persuasion dialogue, refers to
rational persuasion using reasoned argumentation. Rational persuasion refers to the
roles of the parties, the kinds of moves they make in questioning and replying, the
rules of the procedure, and the commitments of the two parties. Each party begins
the dialogue with a set of commitments, and these sets are added to, or reduced, as
the dialogue proceeds. The role of the proponent is to get the respondent to
become committed to a proposition that he was not committed to before, by
using arguments based on his prior commitments. The transition from a partici-
pant’s initial lack of commitment to his subsequent commitment represents the
concept of rational persuasion. But as Hamblin (1970: 264) pointed out, it is not
psychological persuasion or a person’s actual change of beliefs that is the key
concept here. The notion of rational persuasion represents the commitments a
participant can be held accountable for, once she has agreed to take part in a
dialogue and has made moves in that dialogue that incur commitments, according
to the rules of the dialogue.
The best known subtype of persuasion dialogue is the critical discussion. Accord-
ing to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 34), the purpose of the critical discus-
sion is to resolve a conﬂict of opinions by means of rational argumentation.
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 85–86), there are four stages in
a critical discussion. At the confrontation stage (p. 85), a dispute arises where the one
participant advances a so-called ‘‘point of view’’, and the other participant casts
doubt on that point of view, or advances an opposed point of view. A point of view is
a proposition (thesis) and an attitude (pro or contra) with respect to that proposi-
tion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 15). At the opening stage, the two par-
ties agree to attempt to resolve the dispute by expressing opposed points of view,
and undertake to resolve the conﬂict by advancing opposed rational arguments.
During the argumentation stage, each side brings forward arguments to support his
or her own point of view, and each takes turns questioning and criticizing the
arguments put forward by the other side.
Following are the 10 dialogue rules that govern all moves made by both partici-
pants during the argumentation stage. This set of rules can be found in (van Eeme-
ren and Grootendorst, 1992: 208–209), and also in (van Emeren and Grootendorst,
1987: 284–291). The version quoted below is from the latter source.
Rules for a critical discussion
Rule 1: Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on
standpoints (p. 284).
Rule 2: Whoever advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so
(p. 285).
Rule 3: An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really
been advanced by the protagonist (p. 286).
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Rule 4: A standpoint may be defended only by advancing argumentation relating
to that standpoint (p. 286).
Rule 5: A person can be held to the premises he leaves implicit (p. 287).
Rule 6: A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense
takes place by means of the common starting points (p. 288).
Rule 7: A standpoint must be regarded as conclusively defended if the defense
takes place by means of arguments in which a commonly accepted scheme of argu-
mentation is correctly applied (p. 289).
Rule 8: The arguments used in a discursive text must be valid or capable of being
validated by the explicitization of one or more unexpressed premises (p. 290).
Rule 9: A failed defense must result in the protagonist withdrawing his standpoint
and a successful defense must result in the antagonist withdrawing his doubt about
the standpoint (p. 291).
Rule 10: Formulations must be neither puzzlingly vague nor confusingly ambig-
uous and must be interpreted as accurately as possible.
The question of whether the dispute has been resolved is addressed at the closing
stage of the critical discussion. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984:
86), a successful critical discussion ends with the resolution of the initial conﬂict of
opinions which shows that one party was successful while the other was not. Unless
the conﬂict is resolved, according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 86), ‘‘it
is unclear whether the discussion has had any point’’. In short, a successful critical
discussion must achieve closure by resolving the original conﬂict of opinions in favor
of the one side or the other.
As noted above, the interrogation appears, at least at ﬁrst glance, to be a sub-
species of information-seeking dialogue. The information may be needed to assist a
police investigation, or for security purposes, before an intended crime or terror
activity is committed. With the police investigation in mind, Dillon (1990: 75)
asserted, ‘‘The purpose of interrogation is to obtain factual, truthful information
about some criminal matter at issue.’’ But as one can see from this description, its
purpose is not just to obtain information. The reason for obtaining the information
is to use it in some in the service of security or justice, for example in a subsequent
criminal proceeding or in a security investigation. The ultimate purpose of the
interrogation is to ﬁnd information that is useful for some anterior purpose. The
interrogation often has a certain legal or security function as its ultimate purpose,
and so it is very special subtype of information-seeking dialogue. According to
Buckwalter (1983: 4), the common goal of the interview and the interrogation is ‘‘to
obtain factual and relevant information,’’ but the diﬀerence between the interview
and the interrogation lies in the attitude of the respondent. An interview is deﬁned
as the questioning of a respondent who is ‘‘ready, willing and able to tell what he
knows.’’ (p. 4). An interrogation is deﬁned as ‘‘a more formal questioning of a sus-
pect, or of a reluctant or hostile witness, or of anyone who is unwilling to discuss
freely any information that he or she possesses.’’ (p. 4). According to this account,
both are information-seeking dialogues, but the diﬀerence is in the attitude and
collaborativeness of the respondent. A problem with this account is that a witness or
an innocent suspect who is being interrogated by police may be fully cooperative.
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Such a person may willingly and freely submit to the interrogation. But if he knows
he is being interrogated, he may be very wise not to treat the dialogue as an ordinary
interview. The issue of whether an interrogation always has to be coercive or
deceptive will be taken up below.
Royal and Schutt (1976: 21) deﬁned the interview as ‘‘a meeting between two or
more persons to talk about a speciﬁc matter.’’ They add that this deﬁnition would
include interrogation, which they deﬁned as ‘‘the art and mechanics of questioning
for the purpose of exploring or resolving issues’’ (p. 21). They cited the diﬀerence
that interviewing is ‘‘less formal’’, but claimed that in their book, the terms ‘inter-
viewing’ and ‘interrogation’ are used interchangeably. There are some diﬀerences
between these two accounts, and some questions to be resolved. It doesn’t seem right
to say the purpose of the interrogation is to question for the purpose of resolving or
exploring issues, because that makes it seem like a kind of persuasion dialogue. But
of course, persuasion could be partly, or sometimes involved in an interrogation. It
seems better to classify both interview and interrogation as subtypes of information-
seeking dialogue, but the diﬀerences between the two are surely more than just dif-
ference in the attitude of the respondent. At any rate, although both the interview
and the interrogation are widely recognized as distinct types of dialogue, there
appear to be important diﬀerences on how to deﬁne them as goal-directed structures
of questioning.
The foregoing attempts to deﬁne interrogation raise a number of interesting
questions of some importance for argumentation theory generally, and in parti-
cular, for our understanding of legal argumentation. What is exactly is the
interrogation as a type of dialogue? How is it diﬀerent from the interview? Does
an interrogation have to be coercive or deceptive? How is interrogation diﬀerent
not just from interview, but from other types of dialogue like cross-examination
in a trial? The argumentation methods used in these two types of dialogue have
much in common (Kassin et al., 1990). What are the methods and techniques of
argumentation commonly used in interrogations? What essential characteristic is
distinctive about interrogation as a subtype of information-seeking dialogue?
What do the kinds of arguments commonly used in interrogations have in
common with sophistical tactics of argumentation associated with informal fal-
lacies in logic? Do the other types of dialogue sometimes have a place in some
intervals in interrogations? And what role do dialectical shifts both from and to
interrogation dialogue play in the evaluation of the arguments? So far, the
resources of argumentation theory have not been brought to bear on these
questions.
2. Characteristics of the interrogation
The interrogation is essentially an asymmetrical types of dialogue, meaning that
the goals and methods of argumentation used by the one side are quite diﬀerent
from those on the other side. The goal of the questioner is to get any kind of infor-
mation out of the respondent that is needed for some purpose, like taking action to
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prevent harm, or pursuing an investigation. The goal of the respondent is to pursue
his own interests and goals, as he sees them, balancing them against the wider needs
and interests of the community. It is up to him to decide whether his interests are
best served by giving out information or by withholding it. He may decide to give
out wrong information that will deceive his interrogator, or lead her in a wrong
direction (Levy, 1999). How he judges his interests may depend, in a police inter-
rogation, on whether he is a witness or a suspect. If he is a witness, he may perceive
his goal as simply to provide the information that he has, in response to the ques-
tions asked. He may have various reasons for not wanting to do that, in a given case,
but may see his goal as providing the needed information. If he is a suspect, his goal
is to give out as little information as possible—especially any information that might
tend to incriminate him, or might later be used against him if taken as a confession
of having committed a crime. And that could be just about anything, depending on
what inferences a prosecutor might draw in front of a jury, or try to get the jury to
draw. In such a case, the respondent’s goal will be to get through the interrogation
without saying anything at all, or by saying as little as possible. In either case, the
respondent needs to be careful, and may have strong reasons for concealing infor-
mation, or at least not giving out information under interrogation. To sum up then,
the interrogation is a highly asymmetrical type of dialogue in which the aims of the
questioner are quite diﬀerent from that of the respondent.
The questioner is generally an oﬃcial. In cases of criminal interrogations, the
questioner is generally a police oﬃcer. The respondent can be either a suspect or a
witness. If the respondent is witness, the dialogue may be described as an interview
rather than an interrogation. This observation suggests that the respondent who is a
suspect is generally assumed to have ‘‘something to hide’’ in an interrogation. But
suppose he is innocent, or is merely a witness, a person has nothing to hide, or so he
thinks. If the police are oﬃcially questioning him in the police station in the guise of
an oﬃcial interrogation, is it really an interrogation (in the sense deﬁned here) or
merely an interview? This theoretical question will be discussed below. In the sense
deﬁned here, the interrogation as a dialogue type is characterized by an adversarial
element. The interests of the respondent may be assumed to be generally at cross-
purposes with those of the questioner. This opposition would be clear is the case of a
prisoner of war or terrorist who is being interrogated. The respondent wants to
conceal the information he possesses, but the questioner wants to reveal this infor-
mation so he can pass it on to her superiors who have a use for it. But below it will
be argued that this tension or opposition is a general characteristic of the inter-
rogation as a type of dialogue.
Given such a general opposition of goals, you might question why the respondent
does not simply refuse to take part in the dialogue at all. This situation is sometimes
what happens. For example, the prisoner of war may refuse to say anything beyond
telling his name, rank and serial number. But what this observation also reveals is
that there is generally a coercive element in the interrogation. The respondent is a
prisoner, who has no choice but to be questioned. Or the respondent may be
required by law to take part in the dialogue, as in the case of a suspect or witness in
a criminal investigation. This coercive aspect clearly sets the interrogation oﬀ from
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information-seeking dialogue, and from other types of dialogue. It is an important
reason why the interrogation is often thought to be logically suspect or deviant as a
type of dialogue. Since the one party is pressured to take part, it is hard to condemn
him for committing evasions, deceptions or fallacies in the moves he makes in the
dialogue, although he may go too far in some cases. Viewed from this angle, the
whole interrogation appears to be a kind of unfair or illicit process, at least in cer-
tain respects, even though its goal may be a good one.
The interrogation has four stages. First, there is the formative stage, in which
some trial or tribunal requires evidence to be collected, and one plausible source of
evidence is designated as information that can be obtained by interviewing a parti-
cular person. At this stage, the framework is set in place that will determine what
kind of information is being sought, as relevant to the case. Second, there is a pre-
paratory stage in which the questioner gets an idea of what to ask, and (presumably)
makes a list of the questions to be asked to the respondent. Third, the argumenta-
tion stage is the actual dialogue sequence of questions and replies, which are typi-
cally recorded in notebooks or on a video or audio tape recording. Fourth, the
closing stage of the interrogation takes place when the session is concluded and the
body of information that has been collected is assembled in some form. When the
session is concluded is something that is up to the questioner. The questioner will
conclude the interrogation when either she thinks she has got the information nee-
ded, or when she thinks there is no possibility of obtaining this information from the
respondent. The respondent has very little choice on when the session will end,
except that, as the questioner may emphasize quite often, if the respondent gives out
the required information, there will be no need to continue. Unlike the critical dis-
cussion, the stages proceed not by the agreement of both parties, but by the uni-
lateral choice of the interrogator. The reminder that the interrogator is the one who
will choose to end or continue the session is often used as a way of encouraging the
respondent to give out the information that is wanted.
The goals and stages of the negotiation as a type of dialogue give rise to the kinds
of tactics used by a questioner. Because the respondent is essentially reluctant to
take any meaningful part in the process, and may be well advised not to, the ques-
tioner must use tricky techniques to get any results. First of all, the questioner must
appear to be friendly and cooperative, even sympathetic to the respondent. Second,
the questioner must be very patient, and give plenty of time for answers. Third, the
questioner must be methodical, and go by a list of questions that have been pre-
viously prepared (Dillon, 1990: 82). Fourth, the questioner must repeat questions
that have not been answered yet. And ﬁfth, and most important, the interrogation
must go on for a long, indeﬁnite period of time. The technique is to wear the
respondent down, and to convey to him the idea that the tiresome interrogation will
only be over when he yields the sought-after information. According to Dillon
(1990: 80), there should be no time limit for an interrogation, and the pause after a
question or answer should give the respondent all the time he needs to ﬁnish his
answer.
It has been emphasized above that the critical discussion depends on the agree-
ment of both parties to jointly undertake this kind of dialogue and to engage in a
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kind of argumentation that will move the dialogue along towards its successful
completion. Agreement is especially characteristic of the opening stage. As noted
above, the opening stage is deﬁned as the stage where the two parties agree to
attempt to resolve the dispute by expressing their points of view. The very opposite
is characteristic of the interrogation as a type of dialogue. One party is pressured or
even forced to take part in it, and does so reluctantly and under coercive conditions.
The rules for the critical discussion also make this contrast clear. Rule 1 forbids
parties from preventing each other from advancing a standpoint, indicating that
putting forward one’s standpoint is what one tries to do. In contrast, in an inter-
rogation, one side is trying to impart as little information as possible, or certainly
does not generally stand to gain by putting out lots of information, while the other
side is trying to prevent the ﬁrst party from concealing this information.
The goal of an interrogation is to get information from a party who has it, and
who may be trying to conceal it, and who, at any rate, is likely to be reluctant to give
it out. But just getting information of any sort is not characteristic of an interroga-
tion. The interrogation is an attempt to get some information needed for a speciﬁc
purpose. It may be information that is needed for a practical purpose, for example
to save lives, in the case of the interrogation of a terrorist, or in a military case of
prisoner interrogation. Or it may be police interrogation where the purpose is to get
evidence, for example evidence of the kind needed in a criminal investigation. In the
former kind of case, the ultimate purpose is to take action of some sort. For example
the purpose may be to foil a terrorist plot. In such a case, the interrogation is an
information-seeking dialogue that is embedded in a deliberation dialogue. In other
words, the agency undertaking the interrogation is trying to achieve some practical
goal, and is thus trying to get information needed to achieve the goal. Intelligent
deliberation is often based on information needed to ﬁnd out what is happening or
has happened, because directing a plan of action is only possible to the extent that
the circumstances are known.
Because of its embedding into a deliberation, the rules for interrogation dialogue
are not based on agreement, and are not collaborative in the way the rules for a
critical discussion are. First, each party must decide what he or she wants out of the
dialogue. The respondent may simply want to conceal the information he possesses.
But he may be willing to let some of it out, perhaps in a distorted form, in order to
get a lighter sentence or to prevent harm to himself, for example (Levy, 1999). Thus
he needs to decide what he can trade oﬀ versus what he must try to conceal. The
interrogator must decide what information is really important to her, and then she
must try to get that, even if she doesn’t ﬁnd out other things that would also be of
interest. Then the dialogue takes the form of a tug of war to get or conceal this
information. Thus an interrogation frequently shifts to a negotiation type of dia-
logue. The interrogator, for example, may argue, ‘‘If you tell me this, I’ll give you
that’’. Or the respondent may bargain by arguing, ‘‘If you give me this (e.g. freedom,
or immunity from prosecution) then I’ll tell you that’’.
Thus interrogation as a type of dialogue does not depend on the agreement of the
participants in the way the critical discussion does. And it tends to shift into delib-
eration and negotiation dialogues, and to be based on embeddings into these other
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types of dialogue. Thus the goal of an interrogation is not just to get information,
but to get it for some prior purpose or use. Accordingly, interrogation doesn’t have
rules that are similar to those of the critical discussion. But it does have rules of a
more practical sort that express goals and practical strategies of the participants. It
is an assumption of the interrogation that the interrogator has some means of
extracting information at her disposal, but also that these means are limited. For
example, they may be limited by law, or by international agreements. If she over-
steps these allowed means, the information may then become useless. At the opening
stage, the respondent must decide whether to remain silent, and not take part in the
interrogation at all, or whether to take part in some fashion. Of course, in some
cases the respondent may be quite willing to participate, and may want to give the
information to this interrogator. But in the normative rules formulated below, it is
assumed that the respondent does not want to give out the information, or at least
all of it, but wants to appear compliant by taking part in the dialogue.
Rule 1: The respondent needs to take care not to inadvertently say something that
might give out the information he wants to conceal, or allow the proponent to infer it.
Rule 2: The proponent may coerce the respondent to reveal information through
threats or sanctions, but only by the means allowed.
Rule 3: The proponent needs to pose questions to the respondent, and these
questions can, and often should be, leading, loaded and deceptive.
Rule 4: The respondent should answer in formulations that are vague, ambiguous,
misleading or confusing, if that will help serve his ends.
Rule 5: The proponent should probe critically into the respondent’s prior replies,
and try to use them to extract information.
Rule 6: The respondent should take care to try to be consistent in his replies and
in the commitments that can be inferred from them.
Rule 7: If the proponent ﬁnds inconsistencies in the respondent’s commitments, or
implausible statements, or statements that are inconsistent with information from
other sources, she should ask questions that critically examine them.
Rule 8: If the proponent extracts the information she wants from the respondent,
then she has achieved her goal and the dialogue concludes in her favor.
Rule 9: If the proponent terminates the interrogation without getting the infor-
mation she wants, and the respondent preserves his interests, the dialogue concludes
in the respondent’s favor.
Rule 10: The two parties can use any arguments, even ones considered irrelevant
or fallacious from the viewpoint of a critical discussion, to achieve their ends.
The proponent has the power to decide when the interrogation will actually end.
However, from a normative point of view, it ends when the objectives of the parties
have been attained or not. Thus it can be seen that the interrogation is a deeply
adversarial type of dialogue. One party tries to conceal the information the other
tries to obtain. There can be collaboration, especially as the dialogue shifts to
negotiations where trade-oﬀs and compromises are made. But the whole dialogue is
based on an opposition between the goals of the two parties.
One can see that the critical discussion is quite diﬀerent from the interrogation.
Rule 1 says that parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting
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doubt on standpoints. In a critical discussion, both sides must be free to advance the
strongest possible arguments to support their positions. In the interrogation, the
questioner directs the questioning, whereas in a critical discussion, both sides share
control. Each must bring forward arguments, and question the arguments of the
other party. Both sides must be free, as the ﬁrst rule indicates. In an interrogation,
the situation is quite diﬀerent. One side is not free at all, and must submit to the
questioning of the other.
3. The interrogation as a normative framework
The interrogation seems to be a normative framework within which argumenta-
tion can be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate as used within that frame-
work. But there is an initial problem inherent in such a proposal. From a logical
point of view, some see the interrogation as inherently coercive and deceptive, while
others see the interrogation as having a legitimate place as a goal-directed type of
dialogue. So before the interrogation can be used as any kind of normative frame-
work for evaluating argumentation, this question of whether the interrogation itself
is inherently good or bad has to be dealt with.
One factor that makes the interrogation distinct from the basic type of informa-
tion-seeking dialogue is that of the freedom of the participants. In a normal infor-
mation-seeking dialogue, it would be assumed that both parties are freely engaging
in the dialogue, and that the one party is not the prisoner of the other. In fact, it is a
normative requirement of the simple kind of information-seeking dialogue that both
parties should be free to ask questions, or to put forward arguments or opinions.
Neither party should bring pressure to bear to try to prevent the other party from
putting forward such arguments or opinions. In fact, bringing such pressure to bear,
for example, by using threats, would normally be considered fallacious in informa-
tion-seeking dialogue. In the interrogation, however, the respondent’s role is like
that of a prisoner of the party who asks the questions.2 Thus the interrogation is
quite diﬀerent from the normal kind of information-seeking dialogue that one would
see as typical of this type of dialogue.
This key diﬀerence poses a question. Should the interrogation be seen as a kind of
defective information-seeking dialogue, as a type of dialogue that is contrary to the
general aims of information-seeking dialogue? Or should it be seen as a legitimate
type of dialogue in its own right? The question here is one of how the arguments or
other moves used in an interrogation ought to be judged from a dialectical point of
view. By the latter interpretation, we could say that there are good interrogations and
bad interrogations, or interrogations that went well, and those that did not go so well.
A good interrogation would be one that brought out the information that the inter-
rogator was trying to ﬁnd (and that is correct information). A bad interrogation would
be one that failed in this aim. The question here is whether interrogation is a legitimate
2 Of course, it is not literally true that the person being interrogated always has to be a prisoner.
Witnesses or suspects who are not under arrest, for example, can be interrogated by the police.
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kind of information-seeking dialogue in its own right, or whether it is inherently
deviant as a framework of argumentation.
Some would say that the interrogation fosters dishonesty, deception and lack of
cooperation (Magid, 2001: 1168). According to this view, interrogation goes inher-
ently against logical argumentation getting at the truth of a matter. Adherents to
such a view might conclude that if that party being interrogated is prudent, he will
simply shut up, and not give any evidence that will later be used against him. This
fact shows, they will say, that the best way that the answerer can come out of the
interrogation preserving his goals in the exchange is not to take part in at all, or at
least never to reveal any information. But not revealing information is contrary to the
goal of the interrogation, or to any type of information-seeking dialogue. So some
would say that the interrogation is inherently contradictory, or goes against the goal
of information-seeking dialogue, and should therefore be classiﬁed as an inherently
deviant or negative type of information-seeking dialogue. According to this view-
point, when an information-seeking dialogue shifts to an interrogation, that is always
a negative or illicit shift that indicates the presence of fallacious argumentation.
Others would say that the interrogation is an institution that will always have a
legitimate place as long as we have wars, threats to security like terrorism, a justice
system, and indeed any circumstances where loss of life is a possibility and harm is
an issue. According to Williams (2000: 212), there is almost universal endorsement
of the interrogation as a component of the justice system by the police community.
These defenders of interrogation claim that it does have a legitimate purpose, and it
is a legitimate type of dialogue within this purpose. They would say that because the
interrogation is a valuable way of obtaining legal evidence, it has an important
and legitimate function.3 Also, they would say, the respondent does not have to
answer the questions by giving whatever information he possesses, if he does not
want to, as guaranteed by his Miranda rights (at least in North America). So he
is not really forced to answer one way or the other. The exponents of this view-
point might even say that the respondent is free to disregard any threats made by
the interrogator, so such use of threats should not necessarily be held to be fal-
lacious in an interrogation.
The question at issue can be put as follows. Should all arguments and argument-
moves used in an interrogation be seen as fallacious or logically defective just
because the framework in which they were used is that of an interrogation? Or
should such arguments be judged as logically good or bad in a given case depending
on whether they contribute to the fulﬁllment of the goal of the interrogation or not?4
According to the one viewpoint, all such arguments should be seen as fallacious
because the respondent is forced in an unnatural way to ‘‘cooperate’’ with the
interrogator. Thus the respondent should be free to lie, to use deception, or to
3 According to Williams (2000: 213), it is reasonable to argue that the police interrogation ‘‘functions
as an integral component of a more general process of account production and legitimation’’.
4 As indicated in Table 1, each type of goal has a goal, and each participant in the dialogue has
an individual goal. The goal of the interrogation, as outlined above, is generally taken to be one of
information-seeking. But this approach may be limited, since it seems to represent only the goal of the
interrogator. These basic matters are discussed further below.
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otherwise frustrate the aims of the interrogation. According to the other viewpoint,
the interrogation exists as an institution in a legal system, so the argumentation in it
should be judged from that perspective, and should not be just given a blanket
condemnation.
When evaluating argumentation in interrogations, it is easy to fall into a negative
mode, and to think that since all interrogations are coercive and one-sided, any
inference, argument or conclusion occurring in or arising from an interrogation is
somehow logically dubious or untrustworthy. This negative evaluation appears
plausible if you look at the interrogation from some other viewpoint or context of
argument, like that of the critical discussion. Just looking at the interrogation in
itself, and not viewing it as a shift from some other type of dialogue, it is possible to
see that there can be good (successful) interrogations and bad (unsuccessful) inter-
rogations. The purpose of an interrogation is to get relevant information of a kind
that is wanted or needed. But that is not all there is to it. The term ‘information’
should be taken to refer to statements that are true, or that are reliable. Getting false
information, or information that turns out to be probably false, judging from all the
relevant evidence, might be even worse than getting no information at all. In short,
looked at in this way, the interrogation does have a goal, and the argumentation
used in it can be normatively evaluated in relation to that goal.
Leo and Ofshe (1998) collected cases of disputed confessions, and discussed sixty
selected cases that fell into three categories: proven false confession, highly probable
false confession and probable false confession (p. 436). In all cases, the pre-
ponderance of the evidence indicated that the defendant was not guilty. One cate-
gory they studied was the police-induced false confession, in which investigators
become so committed to closing a case that ‘‘they improperly use psychological
interrogation techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect into giving a statement that
allows the interrogator to make an arrest’’. Police, in some cases, may cease inves-
tigating the case, or even refuse to fairly take new evidence into account. The ana-
lysis of cases by Leo and Ofshe (1998: 492) shows, in their opinion, evidence of
‘‘shoddy police practice’’ in the use of interrogation methods, which derives from
poor interrogation training. Also, in their opinion (p. 494), the risk of harm caused
by false confessions could be greatly reduced if police were required to fully record
all interrogations, either on audio or videotape. Another lesson they cite (p. 495) is
the importance of careful evaluation of post-admission narratives by police, prose-
cutors, judges and juries. What is clear is that an apparent admission of guilt should
not be just taken at face value by citing the single statement ‘‘I did it’’. Instead, the
sequence of dialogue surrounding the admission should be examined, and taken into
account. The presuppositions in the questions eliciting the admission may be
important, and how strongly the interrogator pressed ahead with loaded, complex
questions, or other tactics, may be signiﬁcant in evaluating a case. The value of a
transcript of the dialogue, in the form of a recording, will be readily apparent to
those of us who are used to evaluating argumentation on a case-by-case basis. The
transcript enables an evaluator to judge the commitments of the participants, based
on some deﬁnite evidence that can be used to constrain interpretations and spec-
ulations about what can be inferred from what was said.
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4. Tactics and techniques of argumentation used in interrogations
Because of the inherently adversarial nature of the interrogation as a type of dia-
logue, the most interesting aspect of it, from a point of view of argumentation the-
ory is to collect and examine the various tactics and techniques used in it. These are
the forms of argument characteristic of interrogation as a framework in which
argumentation is used. Curiously, many of these arguments are similar to common
types of argument used in critical discussions and other types of dialogue, and often
associated with fallacies. Interrogation tactics, although they are rarely mentioned in
treatments of informal fallacies in logic, are deﬁnitely of interest for this ﬁeld of
study. Some of them are excellent examples of deceptive argumentation. The tactics
that have been most studied are those of the interrogator, but is possible for the
party being interrogated to adopt tactics as well. We begin with the former.
Among the deceptive tactics used by interrogators mentioned by Magid (2001:
1168) are the ‘‘good cop bad cop’’ routine, and tactics of lying, like falsely telling
suspects that witnesses have identiﬁed them or that accomplices have given state-
ments against them. One such tactic (p. 1168) was to put an unsophisticated sus-
pect’s hand on an impressive-looking photocopy machine and telling him that the
‘‘Truth Machine’’ will know if he is lying. Below a classiﬁcation of the most com-
mon tactics of deception is presented.5 In addition, there are more extreme methods
of interrogation, like hypnosis and polygraphy, that are used in some cases. In still
more extreme cases, torture, mental or physical, may be used. In contrast to decep-
tive tactics, these are the coercive tactics of interrogation. Below, the deceptive tac-
tics are covered ﬁrst, and then we turn to the coercive tactics.
A catalogue of various tactics and techniques commonly used by police interrogators
has been compiled by Inbau and Reid (1967: 25–122), and comparable tactics are descri-
bed by Royal and Schutt (1976: 115–150), Buckwalter (1983: 207–235) and Wagenaar et
al. (1993: 109–112). These tactics are psychological mechanisms which the police use to
exert pressure in an interrogation, and to try to extract a confession, or to get some other
kind of admission or relevant information. Examining some of the main tactics gives a
good idea of the kinds of deceptive moves that are commonly made by interrogators.
4.1. The easiest way out
This technique is to wear the respondent down, and then inform him that if you
just confess, or give us the desired information, then your problems will be over. As
Wagenaar et al. (1993: 109) put it, ‘‘After many hours of questioning the advice to
confess, ‘so you may go home’, may become very seductive’’. The respondent may
come to believe that if he gives the desired confession, his problem will be solved.
This belief, of course, is quite incorrect, because he will later have to concede that he
admitted something in court that may lead to much worse problems for him. The
5 It is interesting to compare interrogation tactics with the so-called ‘‘dirty tricks’’ used by lawyers in
cross-examinations (Kassin et al., 1990). Many of the arguments used are similar, and are also closely
related to informal fallacies of the kind studied in logic.
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general line of argumentation is well described by Royal and Schutt (1976: 121):
oﬀer the suspect a solution that allows for cooperation and that can be made to
appear less objectionable than any other possible solution.
4.2. The only way out
This tactic is used when conditions become unbearable for the respondent.
Wagenaar et al. (1993: 109) cite the case of a man interrogated about the abuse of
small children. He was humiliated by the police, who made him undress and ridic-
uled him during a long and intense interrogation in which they threatened to turn
him over to the neighborhood. His treatment was found not to be in violation of any
law (p. 110), but was such that he found it intolerable to continue.
4.3. Authority
Inbau and Reid (1967: 117) advocate interrogating an uneducated or unintelligent
criminal suspect as if you were questioning a child. Wagenaar et al. (1993: 110)
observe that suspects who do confess are often ‘‘simple people’’ who are impressed
by the authority of police oﬃcers. In some cases, they note, these people are men-
tally retarded, or have diﬃculties speaking the language.
4.4. Hypnosis
Hypnosis is used in some interrogations as a way to improve memory of distant
events (Taylor, 1984: 4), but Wagenaar et al. (1993: 110) also note that certain phy-
sical features of the interrogation venue can be exploited to achieve a kind of eﬀect
similar to that of hypnosis. Circumstances of the interrogation, like long sessions
conducted in a bare room with strong lighting, can make the respondent tired and
suggestible, creating a state of sensory deprivation that has a hypnotic eﬀect.6
4.5. Catching oﬀ guard
In the ‘‘friendly-unfriendly act’’, one interrogator can be hostile and aggressive,
while another interrogator appears to be friendly and sympathetic (Inbau and Reid,
1967: 62). A sympathetic interrogator can try to establish a friendly rapport. The
suspect may be led to believe that the interrogator is just having an ‘‘oﬀ-record’’
friendly chat during a break from the interrogation.
4.6. Fostering the belief that the suspect is not being interrogated
As an example of this tactic, Wagenaar et al. (1993: 110) cite the case of a police
oﬃcer disguised as a prisoner in the suspect’s cell who elicits a self-incriminating
statement from the cell-mate. This tactic is a violation of the suspect’s right to
6 Problems with using hypnosis are indicated below.
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remain silent when being questioned, and is deceptive because the suspect does not
realize he is being oﬃcially interrogated (p. 110). The trick used here is to disguise
the interrogation as something else, like a friendly conversation. It may be an inter-
rogation, but the respondent does not know that.
4.7. Misrepresenting the law
The interrogator may tell the respondent that remaining silent will be taken as an
admission of guilt, or that a confession will lead to a lesser sentence, or that a con-
federate has already confessed (Wagenaar et al., 1993: 111). Royal and Schutt (1976:
123 suggest that to counter the fear of punishment, the interrogator can point out
that jail time may be less than he thinks, or that probation, light ﬁnes or short sen-
tences are often given in similar cases. They add (p. 123) that the interrogator should
be careful not to promise to arrange these outcomes.
4.8. Distortion of the seriousness of the oﬀence
Inbau and Reid (1967: 40) advise the interrogators to reduce the subject’s guilt
feeling by minimizing the moral seriousness of the oﬀense. An example of this tech-
nique cited by Wagenaar et al. (1993: 111) included the following tactic: the suspect
may be told that the victim is only wounded when he is dead.
4.9. Use of threats
Use of threats of one kind or another is very common in interrogations, but as Inbau
and Reid (1967: 287) warn, the use of strong threats that involve bodily harmwill legally
invalidate a confession. But indirect or milder threats may be useful. An example cited
by Wagenaar et al. (1993: 112) is a case in which a suspect was placed in a fake line-up
and told that he was recognized as having committed a whole series of oﬀences. This was
used to scare the suspect into confessing to the one oﬀence under investigation.
4.10. We already know everything
The interrogator should use questions that already presume that the guilt of the
respondent has been established, in cases where the suspect’s guilt is assumed to be
reasonably certain (Buckwalter, 1983: 220). The suspect can even be told that the evi-
dence against him is already too strong to leave room for denial. The questioner could
even exaggerate or lie. An example of this kind of tactic would be to tell the suspect
that his accomplice has already confessed everything (Wagenaar et al., 1993: 112).
4.11. Sympathizing with the respondent
Inbau and Reid (1967: 38) suggest that the interrogator should sympathize with
the subject, by telling him that anyone else under the same conditions might have
done the same thing.
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Tactic 6 is especially interesting here because it most obviously involves the phe-
nomenon of the dialectical shift. The police may try to suggest to the respondent
that the conversation is not really part of the interrogation, and is really a ther-
apeutic session. The suspect may be told he will ‘‘feel better’’ if he ‘‘gets it oﬀ his
chest’’. The trick here is to suppress the long-term consequences of a confession, and
to dwell on the short-term supposedly beneﬁcial eﬀects for the suspect. Such tactics
may not sound like they would fool anyone, but under the pressure of an inter-
rogation, when the suspect is tired or intimidated, they may work in some cases.
Having covered the deceptive tactics used by interrogators, we now turn to what
were called their coercive tactics above. These methods do not all literally involve
coercion, but they are not based on free and voluntary argumentation, like the
deceptive argumentation tactics. Instead they are based on applying force, other
than just of only making a threat, or they involve applying some kind of external
technique, like a polygraph (lie-detector), that is independent of the persuasion dia-
logue between the interrogator and the person being interrogated.
The interrogator wants to ﬁnd information that is correct. She wants to get at the
truth of a matter. So one of her main concerns is that the respondent may be lying.
There are various ways to ﬁnd this out that are familiar to lawyers who routinely
cross-examine witnesses. The questioner can check what the respondent has said pre-
viously against what others have said, or against what this person has said previously
in the dialogue. One can ﬁnd apparent contradictions among the respondent’s replies,
and accuse the respondent of lying. All these techniques seem relatively reasonable, in
the sense that the two parties are reasoning together to try to get some coherent
account of the matter being investigated. However, there are many other techniques
used by questioners in interrogations to try to detect lying that are of a diﬀerent kind,
including hypnosis, polygraphy, narcoanalysis, voice stress, and pupillometrics.
According to Taylor (1984: 133), although hypnosis appears to be a potentially
helpful tool for purposes of investigation, there is a consensus of experts that there
are too many sources of inaccuracy in it. One of these is the suggestibility of leading
questions (Taylor, 1984: 127). Because hypnosis is based on suggestion, the danger
of leading questions is great, both during the hypnotic state and afterwards, once the
individual has ‘‘awakened’’. Some courts have rejected evidence based on hypnosis,
while others have admitted it under various procedural safeguards. The polygraph,
or ‘‘lie detector’’, and has been widely admitted as evidence by courts (Strong, 1992:
914), even though the technique has some degree of unreliability, and needs to be
conducted with training and experience. Narcoanalysis, or questioning under a
‘‘truth serum’’ like sodium amytal, scopolamine or sodium pentothal, has often been
used in conjunction with hypnosis. These drugs are not foolproof, however, and
experts say that psychopathic, or even normal individuals, can continue to lie under
the inﬂuence of one of these drugs (Taylor, 1984: 309). Voice stress and pupillo-
metrics are two other techniques for attempting to detect lying. Pupillometrics
measures blinking rates and pupil dilation or constriction to determine stress asso-
ciated with lying. Voice stress analysis measures changes and tremors in normal
voice vibrations, working on the assumption that a tremor or abnormality may
indicate that the subject is engaging in deception.
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There are several kinds of tactics that can be used by the party being interrogated.
One is to negotiate with the interrogator. The respondent starts giving out only
small bits of information that are true, but not all that helpful, and then hinting that
more information will be forthcoming if some concessions are oﬀered. Other tactics
come under the heading of pretending to cooperate while giving out incorrect
information. One is to tell the interrogator what she thinks she wants to hear, even
though the account given is distorted, inaccurate or false. Another is to give infor-
mation that will seem plausible but will lead subsequent actions or investigations
down a false trail. According to a recent Newsweek article (Dickey et al., 2002: 24),
both Al Quaeda captives and elite American soldiers are trained in counter-inter-
rogation tactics.
What is most interesting about the use of all these techniques in interrogations is
what they reveal about the nature of interrogation itself as a type of dialogue. While
there is a certain amount of reasoning and exchange of rational argumentation
between the two parties in an interrogation, nevertheless the exchange is curiously
one-sided, and much of it is quite diﬀerent from the kind of argumentation
associated with a critical discussion. The interrogator is trying to extract accurate
information from the respondent, and may use all kinds of coercive and
mechanical means to try to get that information, or be sure it is accurate and
reliable. Many of these methods are attempts to detect lying. So there seems to be
a presumption on the part of the interrogator that the respondent may be lying.
In short, the dialogue is highly one-sided, and there is a suspicion in place against
the respondent. Much of the questioner’s aim seems to be to try to detect any
deception or lying on the part of the respondent, in order to insure that the
information extracted from him is reliable. All in all, the interrogation seems to
be rife with tricky deceptions of various kinds that may be used by both sides.
The respondent may be trying to cover something up, and the questioner has an
arsenal of techniques for trying to probe more deeply and to root out lies or
other deceptions.
5. Use of threats and force in interrogations
Tactic 9 is very interesting with respect to known phenomena studied in logic. The
informal fallacy of argumentum ad baculum is the kind of argument based on a
threat, or appeal to force or fear. Appeals to fear and threats have long been known
to be powerfully eﬀective arguments. It is easy to routinely dismiss such arguments
as fallacious, as the logic textbooks have generally tended to do, and to assume they
are always wrong (from a logical point of view). But these appeals are used so
commonly in advertisements, negotiations and other kinds of everyday conversa-
tional argument exchanges—sometimes for a good purpose, for example to try to
get teenagers to avoid risky sexual behavior—that they do appear to have a legit-
imate function as reasonable arguments. Hence it is simplistic to condemn them as
being logically fallacious in every case. This being so, the problem is where to draw
the line, distinguishing between the fallacious and legitimate cases.
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A speaker presenting a plan for a reorganization of a business concludes her pre-
sentation to the employees of the business with the following words: ‘‘Gentlemen, I
am sure that if you think it over you will see that my suggestion has real merit. It is
only a suggestion of course, and not an order. As I mentioned at our last conference,
I am planning to reorganize the whole business. I still hope, however, that it will not
be necessary to curtail the operations of your department’’. No explicit threat is
made, but it would be very clear to the employees at the meeting that the speaker
has indeed made a threat, and that the threat was made to get the employees to
support the speaker’s suggestion for reorganization. The problem here appears to be
a failure of relevance. The threat does not really support the arguer’s thesis that her
suggestion has merit as a plan. Even if its irrelevance is recognized however, the
threat could be quite persuasive to the to the employees, as a reason for compliance.
This case is an example of the kind of argument traditionally classiﬁed as an ad
baculum fallacy by the logic textbooks. But exactly what the fallacy consists in
remains unclear.
Another kind of argument covered under the same heading is the fear appeal.
Much used in current politics, as well as sales and advertising argumentation, this
argument tries to get a target audience to adopt a course of action by portraying the
only alternative as some horrible disaster (usually death or severe injury) that is very
fearful to the audience. The classic case was the so-called Willie Horton series of ads
used by the Bush campaign to suggest to voters that Michael Dukakis was ‘‘soft on
crime’’. Recently, fear appeal ads have been prominently used in anti-smoking and
anti-drunk-driving ads. Fear appeal arguments certainly are persuasive, but are they
fallacious? When they are used for good ends, like persuading people not to smoke,
or not to drive while under the inﬂuence of alcohol, it is hard to condemn them.
There appear to be diﬀerences of opinion on whether threats used in police inter-
rogations are legitimate or not. Wagenaar et al. (1993: 111) write that explicit threats
and promises are illegal in the US, citing Bram v. United States, 168 US 532 1897.
But they add that this doctrine does not apply to cases of plea-bargaining in the US,
whereas it does in the UK (R. v. Turner, 1970, 2QB 321 ; 54 Cr. App. R. 352, C.A.).
Nor is it said to apply in the US in cases where the threat is suggested rather than
explicitly stated (Wagenaar et al., 1993: 11). According to Inbau and Reid (1967:
187), a confession will be held to be legally invalid if obtained ‘‘after a suspect
had been led to believe that unless he confessed he was in danger of loss of life or
bodily harm.’’ This test has been extended to include a confession obtained by
telling the suspect that unless he confessed he would be sent to the penitentiary
for more serious crimes (p. 188). Other courts have held that use of phrases like,
‘‘You had better confess’’ constitutes a threat of a kind that nulliﬁes a confession
(p. 190).
Even worse than threats, various forms of force are known to be applied in some
kinds of interrogations, including the use of torture. The methods are generally
regarded as illegal, as applied to civilians, and are regarded as unethical and con-
trary to international agreements, even in wartime (Andersen, 2002). However,
harsh methods, and even torture, are frequently used in war, or against terrorists, on
the grounds that lives of civilians or of one’s own troops are at stake. Use of torture
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has often been justiﬁed, both on grounds of its wide use and its necessity to save lives.
On the program Sixty Minutes (22 September 2002), Professor Alan Dershowtiz
argued that torture of a terrorist would not be against the Fifth Amendment. He
also stated that every democratic country would use torture if it was the only way to
save 500 or 1000 lives to get information about a bomb about to go oﬀ (CBS News
Transcript, 2002: 2). Its association with harsh and painful methods of questioning
may be one reason why the term ‘interrogation’ has such a negative connotation,
calling to mind scenes of helpless prisoners being intimidated and even mentally and
physically tortured.
6. Questioning and answering in the interrogation
What types of questions are asked is very important to the success of an inter-
rogation, and the order in which the questions are asked is also very important.
Several diﬀerent types of questions used in the interrogation have been classiﬁed by
Dillon (1990: 85–91).
6.1. Opening questions
At the start, no questions should be asked about the crime, and the purpose
of questioning at this point is to ‘‘get the respondent talking’’(p. 85). The
opening question should be a yes–no question that is easy for the respondent to
answer.
6.2. Free narrative question
With this type of question, the interrogator simply names a topic, and then asks
the respondent to tell what he knows about it. An example (Dillon, 1990: 85) is the
question: ‘‘I understand you were present when the liquor was delivered, so would
you please describe what happened’’. The questioner should then listen to the reply
without interrupting.
6.3. Direct question
A direct question follows up a narrative question by asking about a speciﬁc item.
According to Dillon, the experience of interrogations has shown that it is best to
avoid value-laden terms when asking direct questions. For example (p. 86), ‘‘An
actual rapist will admit having sex with a woman but will deny raping her’’. Or,
‘‘Tough guys ﬁght somebody, not assault and batter them’’ (p. 86). So the ques-
tioner should stick to language that directly describes the actions at issue, and not
use value-laden language of a kind that imputes guilt. Since language in a criminal
investigation will tend to be laden with ethical values, the questioner should make an
eﬀort to rephrase questions in a more direct way that removes these emotive con-
notations of the words.
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6.4. Cross-questioning
In cross-questioning, a questioner checks and veriﬁes one answer against another,
probing the vague, evasive, or apparently contradictory answers (p. 89).
6.5. Review questions
These conﬁrm previous answers, as in the question, ‘‘Is that correct?’’, or at the
closing stage ask, ‘‘What else do you know?’’ (Dillon, 1990: 90).
It can be seen from this list that diﬀerent kinds of questions are appropriate at
diﬀerent stages of the interrogation. Opening questions are obviously appropriate at
the opening stage. Review questions are appropriate at the closing stage. At the
closing stage, the questioner closes her notebook, and there will be small talk. Even
at this stage, the interrogator is advised to be on the alert for clues that might be
dropped by the respondent in the form of unguarded statement made in casual
remarks. The respondent is also advised to be wary of letting such casual remarks
drop in ‘‘small talk’’, for a jury may take the remark in quite a diﬀerent way, out of
context—in a way that implies guilt or the committing of a crime. According to
experimental results cited in (Taylor, 1984: 121), asking narrative questions gen-
erally resulted in fewer errors than asking direct questions requiring short replies,
but the answers tended to be less complete.
As noted above, an interrogator needs to be aware of value-laden terms that occur
in questions. All questions have presuppositions, and all questions posed in natural
language will contain words and phrases that have emotive connotations, both
positive and negative. The suggestiveness of a question can have subtle eﬀects on the
respondent who is a witness. What may occur is that the suggestive terms in the
question can result in the interrogator’s views being incorporated into the memory
of the witness. A loaded question as used in an interrogation is a question that con-
tains presuppositions such that when the respondent gives any direct answer to the
question he concedes certain assumptions that are at issue and that are damaging to
his interests or the interests of someone who actions he has witnessed. For example,
the question, ‘‘Where did you hide the gun?’’, presupposes that the respondent had a
gun. If he gives a direct answer, citing any location, then he concedes that he pos-
sessed a gun. A complex question is one that combines several presuppositions, in
eﬀect, combining several questions in to one. The classic case of a question that is
both complex and loaded is: ‘‘Have you stopped abusing your spouse?’’ No matter
which of the two direct answers the respondent gives, he concedes engaging in
spousal abuse at some time or other. A so-called leading question takes the respon-
dent in a certain signiﬁcant direction as a soon as gives a direct answer. Leading
questions can be legitimate in an interrogation, but they can have subtle eﬀects that
the interrogator or others might not be aware of, and that can be highly misleading.
Complex and loaded questions can be reasonable, provided they come in the right
order of questioning in a dialogue sequence. For example, suppose that in an inter-
rogation, the respondent just admitted that he had abused his spouse. Then asking
the complex and loaded question ‘‘Have you stopped abusing your spouse?’’ could
D. Walton / Journal of Pragmatics 35 (2003) 1771–1802 1791
be quite appropriate. Fallacious questions tend to occur when there is an unaware-
ness of the complex or loaded nature of a question, and misleading conclusions are
drawn from the asking and answering of the question (Walton, 1995: 202–205).
Most questions of the kind asked in an interrogation are loaded, in one way or
another, simply in virtue of the emotive connotations of the language used to ask the
question. Psychologists have studied so-called ‘‘response eﬀects’’ of question word-
ing, and shown that they are highly prevalent in the kinds of questions used in sta-
tistical polls and surveys (Schuman and Presser, 1981). What is vital is to understand
that every question tends to have a ‘‘spin’’ on it, determined by its presuppositions
and by the language used to pose the question.
There is an empirical method of determining how heavily a question is loaded in
virtue of the language it contains. The method has two steps. The ﬁrst step is to ask
the question in a statistical poll, and tabulate the results. The second step is to
replace the term you think has an emotive spin on it with a descriptively equivalent
but emotively neutral term, and then ask the revised question in a poll with a group
of respondents selected in the same way as the ﬁrst group. Schuman and Presser
(1981) used this method extensively for determining response eﬀects of question
wording. An illustration of the technique is cited by Moore (1992: 343–344). A 1985
survey asked respondents whether too little money was being spent on welfare.
Nineteen percent of respondents said ‘yes’. But then when a group of respondents
selected by the same criteria were asked the same question with the word ‘welfare’
replaced by the descriptively equivalent phrase ‘assistance to the poor’, 63% said
‘yes’. The diﬀerence of 44 points is the so-called ‘‘response eﬀect’’ of the wording in
the question. Such a response eﬀect can be used as an empirical means of judging to
what extent a term used in question is loaded.
Using loaded questions, and other aggressive questioning tactics of the kind noted
above, are legitimate in an interrogation. But if they are pressed ahead too aggres-
sively, the danger is that of getting a false confession. In an interrogation, it is better
to move ahead persistently, but also patiently and methodically. Using complex
questions with emotive question wording and tricky presumptions built into the
question may just confuse the respondent, and others who have to try to make sense
of the transcript later. Pressing ahead too hard to try to force a confession may
subvert the goal of the interrogation by yielding information that turns out to be
false or unreliable as evidence.
7. Dialectical shifts and the value of interrogation
Frequently the interrogation will shift to a diﬀerent type of dialogue. For instance,
it is very common for a criminal interrogation to temporarily shift to a negotiation
dialogue. For example, the interrogator may argue that the police will reduce the
charge against him if he cooperates by giving out information. Or the person being
interrogated may oﬀer to give out some information is some concessions are made.
Another common type of shift occurs where the interrogator engages in ‘‘small
talk’’, and may even try to pose as a sympathetic friend, who can help out the
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respondent, if only he would ‘‘cooperate’’. Various kinds of bribes or threats may be
made at this point, marking the transition to a kind of negotiation dialogue, or at
least marking the attempt of the questioner to initiate this type of dialogue. The
questioner’s intent is to facilitate the interrogation dialogue by using the negotiation
dialogue to move the interrogation dialogue ahead. This shift is of the kind called a
unilateral dialectical shift in (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), made by one party without
the knowledge or consent of the other party. Such a shift is not always illicit, but it
could be if the respondent does not really understand what is going on. He may not
understand, for example, that he will not be punished in some way if he does not
cooperate by answering the questions.
What are even more interesting from a logical viewpoint are shifts from other
types of dialogues to the interrogation. For example, when a persuasion dialogue
degenerates into an interrogation, the shift is often of a pathological nature. In a
persuasion dialogue, both parties are supposed to be free to bring forward the
strongest possible arguments they can. Neither party is allowed to prevent the other
party from bringing forward such arguments. If one party tries to present the other
party from doing so, for example, by making threats dominating the conversation,
or even preventing the other party from speaking out on certain things, such a
blocking of the dialogue is regarded as a violation of the procedural rules. While
such moves may even be typical in an interrogation, they are not allowed as accep-
table moves in a persuasion dialogue.
As noted above, interrogation typically appears to be purely negative type of dia-
logue, and to have no redeeming features. And if you look at it from a point of view
like that of a critical discussion, this negative evaluation is warranted. The reason, as
noted above, is that interrogation tolerates deceptive and fallacious argumentation
quite well. In a critical discussion, both parties agree to take part in rational argu-
mentation. But in an interrogation, one party is unwilling and the other not only uses
deception, and even force, to the extent that coercion is allowed. Thus both parties are
in a position where deception is their best tool. Indeed, it has been held that some
deception is present in virtually every interrogation. According to Magid (2001:
1168), ‘‘virtually all interrogations—or at least virtually all successful interroga-
tions—involve some deception’’. Because of this feature, it is easy to see interrogation
as a negative type of dialogue that is to be contrasted with the kind of argumenta-
tion in a critical discussion.
It is possible, however, based on the classiﬁcation of types of dialogue in Table 1,
to see interrogation in a positive light. The purpose of an interrogation is to get
information for some end, and this information could be extremely useful. It could
even save lives, in the case of the interrogation of a terrorist or a prisoner of war.
Thus if you look at interrogation from a practical point of view, it can have value or
beneﬁts. The information extracted from the individual who was interrogated could
be used for some practical purpose, perhaps to foil a terrorist attack on innocent
civilians, or to save many soldiers’ lives by warning them of an attack. From this
point of view, the interrogation can be seen as, at least if not wholly good, at least as
a necessary evil that can have good consequences and a good goal. The basis of this
evaluation is a dialectical shift. Such a dialogue sequence is initially based on a
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deliberation. The goal is to co-ordinate goals and actions when faced by a dilemma
or practical choice. But in order to decide the best course of action, information is
needed. Thus the information acquired by an information-seeking dialogue may
contribute to the goal of the initial deliberation. What has happened is that there has
been a shift from a deliberation dialogue to an information-seeking type of dialogue.
It does not need to be an illicit shift. If the information helps the deliberation, the
shift can be classiﬁed as licit, because it is based on an embedding of the one dialogue
into the other.
Hitchcock et al. (2001) presented a formal model of deliberation dialogue. On
their analysis, a deliberation dialogue arises out of a need to take action for some
practical purpose. At the opening stage of the deliberation dialogue, a so-called gov-
erning question about what is to be done is formulated. At the argumentation stage,
various action options appropriate to the governing question are articulated and con-
sidered by the participants. Arguments for and against each are considered. At the
closing stage, the participants make a unanimous decision on which proposal for action
to accept. In their formal model, there are rules for the various locutions (speech acts)
that can be made at each move, and rules governing the order of such moves. In this
model, the information that comes in through an information-seeking dialogue can be
relevant to the deliberation. It can be extremely useful at the argumentation stage.
Although we might condemn interrogation from a point of view of the critical
discussion model of what argument should be like, a diﬀerent perspective can be
achieved by adopting the deliberation model. For example, the interrogation could
be justiﬁed, despite its deceptive or coercive nature, if it led to outcomes like the
saving of lives that overcome the negative aspects. Thus with the issue of putting a
positive or negative value on an interrogation, these two factors always have to
weighed on a balance of considerations.
8. Interrogation and inquisition
The interrogation may often be confused with a type of dialogue often called
‘inquisitorial’. This type of dialogue may be characterized as one in which the
questioner is trying to impose some kind of religious, political or dogmatic view-
point on the respondent by getting the respondent to ‘‘confess’’ to some crime, or
breach of the dogma. The aim is to ‘‘re-educate’’ the respondent so that he or she
will not commit this crime again. This type of dialogue is often associated with, or
typiﬁed by the so-called Inquisition. Used with a capital I, the term ‘Inquisition’
refers to the historical phenomenon of tribunals mainly in medieval times organized
by the Catholic Church. But with a small ‘i’, the term can be used, in a more general
sense, to refer to a comparable procedure of this general kind of that can occur
during any period of history (Montoya, 1993). The issue in the Inquisition was not
whether the accused person was guilty of the crime he or she was accused of com-
mitting. That was already assumed (Hample, 2001: 139), on the basis of the lengthy
investigation that took place before the part of the inquisition appearing compar-
able to a trial began.
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The Inquisition was an ecclesiastical or church tribunal for the punishment of
individuals guilty of heresy, expounding or acting out any view that was thought to
be against the oﬃcial beliefs of the church at the time; the subsequent punishment
was left to the ‘secular arm’, to which the accused were turned over upon conviction.
The chief characteristics of the Inquisition, and of any inquisition in the more gen-
eral sense, can be speciﬁed as follows. Evidence of these characteristics can be found
not only in the trial transcripts that have survived, but also in the many manuals
that were written, outlining how an inquisition ought to be conducted.
1. The procedure was secret (Alphandery, 1963: 378).
2. The accused were arrested on a basis of suspicion, and were presumed to be
guilty (Alphandery, 1963: 387).
3. The names of witnesses against the accused were not made available
(Alphandery, 1963: 378). Many manuals, from the earliest, state that the
names of the witnesses should be withheld from the accused (Hample, 2001:
139).
4. Moral subterfuges and torture were allowed as ways of extracting a confes-
sion (Alphandery, 1963: 379).
5. The procedure was not litigious, meaning that the purpose was not to provide
an arena for the accused to argue his side of the case (Alphandery, 1963: 379).
The procedure pretty well closed oﬀ any room for the accused to argue his
side of the case. In some cases, the accused could have a lawyer, or could call
witnesses to his good Christian character (Hample, 2001: 141). But the scope
for argument was very limited, and the accused could not eﬀectively argue
that the denunciations were inaccurate or personally motivated (Hample,
2001: 140).
The purpose of the inquisition is not to extract information from the accused. Or at
least, that is not the main goal, even though it is part of the method used. The main
goal is to enforce a religious or dogmatic orthodoxy by visibly punishing heretics—
that is, individuals who appear to depart form the orthodox viewpoint—to enforce
the orthodox views. The intent is to show everyone that the heretic has to undergo a
troublesome and painful tribunal, and thereby promote a climate of fear. The goal is
that nobody will dare to speak out or act out in favor of the heretical viewpoint,
because they will fear the punishment of the inquisition.
The tribunal procedure of the inquisition may be a duly sanctioned legal court, or
it may not be. The Inquisition of Spain took the form of court proceedings, but in
other cases an inquisition only promotes itself as looking like an oﬃcial court pro-
cedure. For example, during the televised McCarthy tribunals, the procedure look a
lot to the viewer like a legal trial in which accused parties were cross-examined, and
evidence brought against them for crimes they allegedly committed (Rovere, 1959).
But the tribunal had no legal status. What is characteristic of the inquisition type of
dialogue is that it appears to be a fair trial, with all the legal trappings, while in reality
none of the legal safeguards of burden of proof are present (Walton, 1999: 239–240).
The burden of proof is on the suspect to prove he is innocent. The presumption is that
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he is guilty. In reality, the inquisition is a one-sided and often secret tribunal in
which the accused has no fair chance to argue against the charge that he has com-
mitted heresy. The implication presented to him that his best bet is to ‘‘confess’’,
show his remorse, and submit to ‘‘re-education’’.
The main diﬀerence between the interrogation and the inquisition is that the
inquisition is a more extreme from of interrogation in which there is only a pretense
of fair procedure, when in fact the respondent has no chance of being shown not
guilty of the oﬀense. Another diﬀerence is that the interrogation is prior to the main
event, the criminal trial that follows, while the inquisition is the main event, in the
form of a trial, or pseudo-trial. In both the interrogation and the inquisition, how-
ever, the respondent is forced to take part. In the interrogation, the respondent is
physically forced to sit in a room and confront his questioners. In the inquisition,
the accused will face some penalty if he refuses to take part, like losing his job. Or he
may, in some cases, be physically forced to take part. But both types of dialogue are
characterized by coercion.
The questioning procedure in the inquisition is quite diﬀerent from that of the
inquiry. In the inquisition, the questioning is highly aggressive. The respondent is
demonized and stigmatized as a person of evil deeds or character who is ‘‘in league
with the devil’’. Hence the respondent is automatically assumed to be a liar, and
whatever he says is discredited from the outset (Walton, 1999: 242). So he is not
really listened to. The only important thing, from the point of view of the inquisi-
tion, is that he should confess his crime, and express a desire to be ‘‘rehabilitated’’ by
turning to the orthodox viewpoint in a public confession and outpouring of remorse.
In this respect, the questioning in the inquisition is quite diﬀerent from that used in
the interrogation. The actual details of what happened are less important than the
emotional feeling of panic and fear surrounding the process. In the medieval Inqui-
sition, for example, the so-called ‘‘evidence’’ was non-falsiﬁable. If the accused party
was old or seen as anti-social, then that was suﬃcient ‘‘evidence’’ of being in league
with the devil. Evidence could even be ‘‘spectral’’, meaning that it is an aura that is
visible only to the accusers (Boyer and Nissenbaum, 1977: 19). Hence the respon-
dent has no way of refuting this kind of evidence. Nobody else can see it, so nobody
else can tell whether it exists or not. If the accuser says you are guilty, then you are
guilty. Hample (2001: 142) calls this self-sealing characteristic reﬂexive argumenta-
tion, using the example of the trial of Joan of Arc. Asked to explain her heretical
actions, she replied that the voices of angels instructed her to do these things. But
since angels would not tell any person to sin, her answer was taken to prove that she
had been instructed by the devil. This, in turn, was taken to prove that she was in
league with the devil.
Another characteristic of the inquisition is the use of loaded questions, like ‘‘Why
didn’t you stop your guilty activities when you knew in your heart they were so
evil?’’ This question is loaded, meaning that no matter what direct answer the
respondent gives, he commits himself to having committed the heretical acts. In the
inquisition, the aggressive use of loaded questions steers the accused, or the witness,
towards a pre-determined admission of guilt. Thus heavy use of emotionally loaded
language is characteristic of the questions used. In contrast, as noted above in
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describing the kinds of questions used in the interrogation, the questioner is advised
to steer clear of emotionally loaded terms, and ask question that are direct and fac-
tual. In this respect, the inquisition is quite notably diﬀerent from the more general
type of interrogation characteristic of the criminal interrogation. The questioning in
the inquisition is much more aggressive, much more emotionally loaded, and
assumes guilt from the very beginning of the dialogue.
To sum up, it seems initially that the inquisition is a subtype of interrogation
dialogue, but as the two types of dialogue are compared more carefully, key diﬀer-
ences emerge. The interrogation is an information-seeking dialogue to get informa-
tion that could be used in a later criminal procedure or for some other purpose, like
saving lives in an emergency. The inquisition dialogue is the criminal procedure
itself, or at least, it is made to look like a proper criminal trial. Its purpose is not to
collect information, but to enforce and propagate some dogmatic religious or poli-
tical viewpoint. In the end then, it may be better not to classify the inquisition as a
subtype of interrogation dialogue, even though the two types of dialogue have
important shared characteristics, like the coercive aspect. A better hypothesis about
their relationship is that the inquisition is designed to look like an interrogation, or
like the criminal trial following up from an interrogation, but this appearance can be
deceiving. Really the purpose of the interrogation is both the collection of informa-
tion for some anterior purpose and the evaluation of the accuracy and usefulness of
the evidence collected by critically examining the arguments on both sides. The
inquisition is only designed to look like that. In reality, its purpose is to secure
orthodoxy against heresy, to serve the interests of this who are the oﬃcial repre-
sentatives of the orthodox movement, cause, or dogma.
9. Conclusions
Two questions that have been posed are what the goal of interrogation should be
as a type of dialogue, and whether interrogation dialogue always has to be coercive
and/or deceptive. As indicated above, interrogation is typically portrayed as a type
of information-seeking dialogue. The goal of interrogation is to get information
from the party being interrogated. The presumption is that he has the information
and that it can be gotten from him by questioning, and possibly by using other
methods as well. But the questioner’s goal is to get the information. Can that be the
goal of the dialogue as a whole, as well? The answer is that interrogation is a hybrid
type of dialogue that involves a shift from deliberation to information-seeking. The
goal of the dialogue as a whole is to take action that may prevent harm of some sort
by ﬁnding the information needed to carry out this practical goal. The interrogator’s
goal is not only to get the needed information from other party, but also, if possible
to test it by critically examining the answers given by that party during the inter-
rogation, based on whatever other evidence she has. The other party may be coop-
erative, and may simply give out the information, but even if he does, the
interrogator cannot take it at face value. And in typical cases, as noted above, the
other party has very good reasons for being extremely careful about what he says. A
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‘‘confession’’ may be the only evidence needed to convict him. Thus, as Megid put it,
an interrogation is virtually always deceptive. Deception and coercion are always
there, even if they are in the background. To conduct an interrogation as if it were a
persuasion dialogue, or a normal information-seeking dialogue, would result in
argumentation that is inappropriate, and even useless for this purpose.
Of course, in a real case, an interrogation could be used for all kinds of purposes.
For example the real goal of setting up a tribunal or inquisition may be to punish
people, or even to visibly punish them to silence others. In this kind of case, the
exercise is a kind of charade however. The real thing that happened, the so-called
speech event,7 was only meant to look like an interrogation. This kind of ‘‘inter-
rogation’’ is a deception, and a common kind of one. Thus we must distinguish
between the interrogation as a normative model of dialogue, and real institutional
and cultural events that are called interrogations. The interrogation, as deﬁned
above, is only an abstract normative model that helps to identify, analyze and eval-
uate argumentation. It is not a real event, or even coextensive with all cases of real
events that may be described as interrogations.
The interrogation represents a type of dialogue in which the one party is restricted
in his power to control the dialogue. He is a supplier of information, and his part in
the dialogue consists of simply giving answers to questions posed by the other party.
He has little say in what direction the dialogue will take, and what questions are
asked. If he is fully cooperative then his role is to just answer each question truth-
fully, and as informatively as possible. On the other hand, he may want to cover
something up, and for this purpose he may engage in lying, or in other deceptions
that are likely to achieve this goal. The questioner, in contrast, is in the driver’s seat.
She poses the questions that probe for the required information. She also tries to
ensure the reliability of this information by various means. She tries to check the
information against other evidence, and against the prior replies of the respondent.
All these aspects of the interrogation make clear how one-sided it is, as a type of
dialogue, and how the one party is in control. These aspects of the interrogation are
very clearly in contrast with the characteristics of the persuasion dialogue, as indi-
cated by the rules for the critical discussion. The rules of the critical discussion
require that both sides put forward strong arguments, critically question the argu-
ments put forward by the other side, and not prevent the other party from doing so.
Both sides must be relatively free to present arguments, and both parties must take a
relatively equal part in interacting argumentatively. Preventing the other party from
presenting an argument, for example by the use of threats or force, is against the
ﬁrst rule of the critical discussion. Any explicit threat made in a critical discussion
will be seen as highly inappropriate.
In sharp contrast, threats are relatively normal in the interrogation and, within
boundaries, especially in extracting a confession for later use in court, threats are
part of the accepted argumentation tactics used by the questioner. Threats may be
7 The speech event is the cultural or institutional setting representing the circumstances in which
communication takes place. For example, an argument will have to be evaluated diﬀerently if it is part of
a legal procedure in a court of law (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992: 64).
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used by an interrogator, ranging from milder threats to mental and physical torture
in more extreme cases, depending on what is allowed and appropriate. In special
context of an interrogation, such moves should not be seen as categorically falla-
cious or inappropriate.8 Not all interrogations are of the familiar legal type, where a
suspect or witness who has Miranda and other rights is being interviewed by simple
questioning.9 Other more coercive and mechanical techniques are likely to be used in
some cases. Among the more invasive forms, techniques like hypnosis, polygraphy,
narconalysis, voice stress and pupillometrics may be used. Interrogations also occur
in a context of war or national emergencies, where legal protections of the usual
kind may not be respected. Then we move on the more invasive forms of inter-
rogation associated with techniques that go beyond the range of verbal argumenta-
tion. In still more aggressive forms of interrogation, force is used, and even torture,
in extreme cases. In short, interrogation is a type of asymmetrical dialogue in which
one party tends to be very powerful and the other party tends to be very passive.
Despite this contrast, some would say that persuasion has an important place in
interrogation. Royal and Schutt (1976: 24) claimed that what the successful inter-
rogator uses, to get a respondent to make admissions against his own self-interest, is
‘‘systematic persuasion, which is conducted in an amiable and humane atmosphere
by the interviewer.’’ Does this mean that during some intervals of a successful
interrogation, there will be shifts to persuasion dialogue? Or is the kind of persua-
sion referred to here not rational persuasion, but more like psychological persua-
sions that could even be described as ‘‘brainwashing’’. Royal and Schutt (1976: 24)
acknowledged that some might object to the techniques of interrogation they advo-
cated, such as conditioning, stress, and appeals to emotion, precisely by using the
term ‘‘brainwashing’’. It could be, then, that persuasion dialogue, of the type deﬁned
above, has little or no place in the successful interrogation. At risk of generalizing,
what could be said is that the two types of dialogue are so antithetical that persuasion
dialogue has really very little place in the interrogation. Persuasion may be used, but
is hardly likely to be the kind of rational two-way persuasion modeled in the persua-
sion dialogue. It is more likely to represent persuasion in the psychological sense of
8 Of course what ethically appropriate and what is appropriate as an argumentation tactic in a
framework of dialogue are two separate questions. Those who try to justify the use of torture cite the
principle of double eﬀect, the principle that the means can justify the end. No argument of that kind is
being advanced here.
9 The expression ‘Miranda rights’ refers to a US Supreme Court decision of 1966 (in the case of Mir-
anda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436). The Supreme Court held that when an individual is taken into custody
and subjected to questioning, the US Constitutional Amendment V privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized. To protect the privilege, procedural safeguards are required. A defendant must be warned
before any questioning by law enforcement that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant must be told that he has the right to an attorney,
and if he cannot aﬀord an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
After these warnings have been given, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation cannot be
used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrates the warnings were given, and
knowingly and intelligently waived. Eﬀective waiver requires the accused was oﬀered counsel but intelli-
gently and understandingly rejected the oﬀer. Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.
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belief-modiﬁcation, without any overtones of rational persuasion of the kind mod-
eled in the critical discussion. On the other hand, as indicated above, tricky argu-
ments and deceptive tactics reminiscent of logical fallacies are the main methods
used in interrogation. Thus persuasion of a fallacious sort does seem to be involved,
and shifts to persuasion dialogue underlie many of these moves.
Looking at the police interrogation of a witness or suspect, another important
thing about the goal of the interrogation becomes evident. This type of interrogation
has the purpose of eliciting evidence, of a kind that can later be used in a trial. So it
is important that the interrogator try to avoid making moves in the interrogation
that would nullify the value of the conversational exchange as legal evidence.
Another factor is that the interrogator should try to avoid becoming overly aggres-
sive in questioning to secure a confession that might be false. Once again, it is
important to insist that the goal of the interrogation should be to collect true infor-
mation that is useful to aid deliberation, and not just to elicit any kind of admission
that might loosely be called ‘‘information’’. It is important to be aware that there
have been many cases of confessions extracted by interrogation that later were
shown to be false or highly dubious.
To sum up, the basic goal of the interrogation is to get information in order to aid
a deliberation or an investigation that will be the basis for taking some kind of
action. But by ‘‘information’’ is meant not just any admission. The target of the
interrogation is to get a particular kind of information that is relevant, useful, and
accurate. In the case of a police interrogation of a witness or suspect, the aim is to
get information that can later be used as evidence in court. The information should
be relevant, in the sense that it is of probative value in relation to some crime or
violation of the law that is suspected. In the case of a threat to security, the aim is to
get information that will serve the interest of justice and security by preventing
harm. But it defeats the real purpose of the interrogation if the admission extracted
from the suspect or witness is relevant, but turns out to be false and misleading or
useless. In short, the goal of the interrogation is to get information that is useful for
some secondary purpose. This secondary purpose can vary with the type of inter-
rogation. In the case of the interrogation of a prisoner of war, the secondary pur-
pose could be to guide action in a military campaign. In the case of the police
interrogation of a witness or suspect, it could be to pursue a criminal investigation
leading to a trial. But for either purpose, the aim is defeated by securing an admis-
sion that later turns out to be false, misleading or unreliable.
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